The authors study the interdependent diffusion of an open source software (OSS) platform and its software complements. They quantify the role of OSS governance, quality signals such as product ratings, observational learning, and user actions upon adoption. To do so they extend the Bass Diffusion Model and apply it to a unique data set of 6 years of daily downloads of the Firefox browser and 52 of its add-ons. The study then re-casts the resulting differential equations into non-linear, discrete-time, state space forms; and estimate them using an MCMC approach to the Extended Kalman Filtern (EKF-MCMC). Unlike continuous-time filters, the EKF-MCMC approach avoids numerical integration, and so is more computational efficient, given the length of our time-series, high dimension of our state space and need to model heterogeneity. Results show, for example, that observational learning and add-on ratings increase the demand for Firefox add-ons; add-ons can increase the market potential of the Firefox platform; a slow addon review process can diminish platform success; and OSS platforms (i.e. Chrome and Firefox) compete rather than complement each other.
INTRODUCTION
Software platforms are ubiquitous in markets for digital goods; famous examples are the Linux and Windows operating systems; and Firefox and Internet Explorer browsers. Here distinct participants contribute to innovation: platform owners who control access to platform services; and communities of third-party developers and end-users who create complementary software and generate online feedback. Platforms can be proprietary (Explorer) or "open-source" (Firefox); in the latter case the software is to be freely used, altered, and shared in agreement with specific licenses; and owners place fewer restrictions on who can participate in platform innovation (Eisenmann et al. 2009 ). As a novel approach to innovation (Lerner and Tirole 2002) , open source software (OSS) stands as an important research topic (von Krogh and von Hippel 2006) in many disciplines. Yet empirical work has largely focused on factors that lead to OSS project success (e.g., time-to-launch) (Grewal et al. 2006; Stewart et al. 2006; Mallapragada et al. 2012) , and less on the forces that account for OSS diffusion over time, among end-users.
Moreover, diffusion studies in marketing have focused on proprietary platforms, where the central question is often how price and other marketing events (Shankar and Bayus 2003) moderate network externalities. What, however, accounts for the joint diffusion of an open platform and its complements, indeed software diffusion in the absence of pricing or other marketing incentives?
In this study, we draw upon the literature on OSS development, diffusion of innovation, and online user-generated content to address this our overall question. For example, owners of closed platforms typically employ strict internal review processes to screen complementary software for quality and user relevance (Evans et al. 2006) ; in contrast, in an open platform system (e.g., Linux, Apache) with limited central controls, end-user online feedback (Chintagunta et al. 2010) becomes one means through which potential adopters identify highvalue (relevant) complements 1 .
Similarly, successful open platform innovation will likely depend on the platform's ability to attract and retain third-party developers (Shah 2006) ; those who implement new complement features, fix bugs, and so on; which in turn could attract adopters to the platform (Gupta et al. 1999) . Moreover, it is often these developers themselves who review software; and manage communication among peers (e.g., peer review process) and end-users.
Thus, we draw on literature to consider how OSS self-governance may influence platform adoption over time. Finally, Raymond (1999) suggests that OSS projects should "release early, and release often" to produce higher quality software. Releasing a product early may attract developers, and gain early end-user feedback (Lakhani and Von Hippel 2003) , which could then facilitate diffusion.
Thus, guided by the above issues and others to be outlined later, we consider the To address these questions we extend the Bass diffusion model (hereafter BDM) to study the joint diffusion of an open digital platform and its complements, given BDM's parsimony, performance, and the intuitive interpretations of its parameters (Hauser et al. 2006) . We apply the extended model to a canonical example, the diffusion of the Mozilla Firefox browser and its add-ons, an OSS (See Figure 1) project initiated in 1998 in response to Netscape's decision to publish its browser's source code. Our resulting response model is dynamic, nonlinear, and heterogeneous; thus for estimation, we re-cast BDM differential equations into non-linear, discrete-time, state-space forms; and then estimate them using an MCMC approach to the Extended Kalman Filter (EKF), a Sequential Monte Carlo method that works with normal-linear approximations. Our EKF-MCMC alogorithm is preferred to other Gaussian filters such as the Unscented Kalman Filter (UKF) and the Augmented Kalman Filter with continuous state space and discrete observations (AKF-CD) (e.g., Xie et al. 1997; Mahajan et al. 2000) , given the lengths of our sample (T=1686 periods), the dimension of our state-space, and the importance of heterogeneity. Recall, the AKF-CD is continuous-time filter whose estimation requires a numerical integration at every period, and so it does not scale well to longer time series and/or high-dimensional problems, typically found in digital market studies. Moreover, the AKF-CD is a numerical procedure and so estimating heterogeneity is not trivial, as it is in iterative, sample based approaches (e.g., MCMC). Now unlike the EKF which approximates non-linear functions, the UKF instead approximates the posteriors of the state variables by sets of sample points (Ristic et al. 2004) ; and for highly nonlinear Gaussian systems the UKF produces typically better results; but our diffusion model is quadratic and so here EKF, performs just as well and is more computationally efficient.
The paper, thus, contributes to an emerging empirical literature on the diffusion of open source innovation. First, it introduces a dynamic model to investigate several factors that could affect the diffusion of an open 2-sided platform, using Mozilla as an example. Although other empirical studies in marketing have considered features of platform innovation, namely indirect network effects (e.g., Gupta et al. 1999; Basu et al. 2003) , to the best of our knowledge, none has addressed features unique to the heterogeneous and interdependent diffusion of an open software platform system. Second, the paper examines the influence of a quick release strategy, a central but rarely tested assumption in OSS innovations (von Krogh and von Hippel 2006) . Three, it examines the role of online, user-generated feedback on the diffusion of open innovation.
Ironically, user generated content is central to the diffusion of an open platform; since the development of complementary software and the self-governing process enveloping it, generate free content that in turn could drive diffusion (Hauser et al. 2006) . Finally, we extend the basic BDM to an interdependent system; and for its estimation, we innovate to design a Bayesian approach to the Extended Kalman Filter (EKF-MCMC). Our specification allows diffusion to be latent, random processes; which in turn give us the flexibility to model adoption patterns beyond the simple s-shaped ones underlying the mixed effects, or basic diffusion model (Goswami 2001) . Similarly, we link diffusion parameters to online ratings and observational learning that varies across product and time; in this way we account for adoption heterogeneity (Dellarocas et al. 2007 ). Lastly, we endogenize the market potential of the complements and control for the likely dis-adoption of free software. Our results show, that observational learning and add-on ratings increase the demand for Firefox add-ons; add-ons can increase the market potential of the Firefox platform; a slow add-on review process can diminish platform success; and OSS platforms (i.e. Chrome and Firefox) compete rather than complement each other.
The main data for this study is a sample of 52 popular Firefox add-ons, free software that complement the Mozilla Firefox web browser. On the end-user side of this 2-sided platform, we collected daily reviews, user base sizes, and number of downloads for a six-year period, 2008 to 2013. For each add-on, we obtained its number of daily users, user ratings, and features of the add-on and its developer such as license types and modes of compensation for developers.
Finally, for the platform, we collected data on the daily number of users of Firefox, and its main competitors, Google's Chrome and Microsoft's Internet Explorer. Though public data on daily platform use are unavailable, we were able to estimate them from other sources, including market share, and public internet global statistics.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the conceptual background and main hypothesis of the study. Section 3 develops the theoretical model. Section 4 presents details of the econometric model. Subsequently, section 5 presents the results of the estimation; and the implications of these results for open innovation. The paper concludes with an overview of the findings, managerial implications and limitations of the study.
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND
What then are the salient features of an OSS platform and its complements for our study?
First, an OSS platform is a type of distributed innovation in which a platform owner invites third-party collaborators to develop complements (add-ons) that extend the capabilities of the platform (Sawhney et al. 2000; Kogut and Metiu 2001; Boudreau 2010) . Studies report that collaborators (typically internet-based software developers and end-users) have two types of motives to participate in OSS projects: intrinsic motives, which include joy, altruism, and autonomy; and extrinsic motives, which include money, skill, and reputation Franck and Jungwirth 2003) . Moreover, the software they create remain public goods (von Krogh and von Hippel 2006) , available online via distinct licenses, which govern software use and distribution. Thus, unlike that of proprietary platforms Tirole 2004, 2006;  Parker (Wang et al. 2012; Frey 2003) . To make the process appear democratic, however, some platforms discourage the committee from evaluating software based upon its market usefulness, leaving that judgment to other developers and users.
Similarly, OSS platforms use various forms of licenses and tools that are consistent with OS ideals but preserve some financial incentives for developers (Subramanian 2009 , Nair et al. 2004 , Katz and Shapiro 1994 . These licenses thus may range from the very restrictive, such as General Public License (GPL), to less restrictive, such as Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD). BSD licenses allow agents to use OSS software without paying royalty on a product sold for profit, encouraging some profit motive among its community members. Alternatively, platform owners may allow its developers to solicit financial support from the end-users, or advertise a developer's online profile.
Platform owners also recognize that while democratic governance can encourage participation, it can also create chaos, arising from the numerous community feedbacks and project requests; a catalyst for this being the speed with which information moves over the internet (Feller and Fitzgerald 2000) . To manage chaos, OSS developers often use a quick release system (Sharma et al. 2002) , as opposed to the slow, cautious approach adopted for proprietary software. As a result, a platform may release an OSS complement version that performs only core but lacks secondary features or final aesthetics; then leverage the expertise of its community to remove bugs, improve product quality, and satisfy user requests. (See Figure 1 for Mozilla's community structure). Raymond 1999 calls this the "release early, release often" approach to software development, a central tenet of OSS that, as we note before, has been rarely tested empirically (Chen et al. 2013) . Bughin et al. (2008) calls such a community interaction "co-creation," as often the same members create and use the software. Co-creation could facilitate the diffusion of an OSS platform, because it may speed creation of complements, which helps platforms compete and promote indirect network externality (Lerner and Tirole 2002).
--Insert Figure 1 here --Of course, the success of an OSS platform may not depend only on the software it creates, but also on the active use of its complements and the tasks the platform undertakes on behalf of its users-developers, such as responding to support requests, and writing reviews (Lerner and Tirole 2002) . These activities studies suggest can build a platform's social capital, which in turn can determine a platform's diffusion (Roberts et al. 2006 Nair et al. 2004 , Katz and Shapiro 1994 , Banaccorsi and Rossi 2003 .
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Given the above background, we can now suggest the following factors, and propose how they may moderate the diffusion of an OSS platform and its free complements: i) the platform's competitors; ii) the add-on review process; iii) network externality of complements; iv) frequent releases of the platform and its complements; and v) online ratings and usage count signals.
OSS Platform Competition
A key distinction between OSS and proprietary platforms is the absence of a pricing mechanism in the former (e.g. Katz and Shapiro 1985, 1994; Shapiro and Varian 2013) . Thus because OSS is free we may be inclined to think that users would adopt multiple platforms (e.g.,
Google
Chrome and Mozilla Firefox); for each platform might have unique features and these are freely available (Cai et al. 2008 ), which in turn may attract more developers to the platform. As a result, we predict:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): As the contributions of the OSS review committee increase, the number of adopters of an OSS platform increases.
Network Externalities
A large installed base of platform users not only influences others to adopt the platform, it also attracts more third-party developers, who in turn may increase the number and diversity of complementary items, which then attract more adopters to the platform. What are some ways through which complementary items (i.e., add-ons) boost platform adoption? First, add-ons provide potential adopters with information that enables them to learn more about the features and utilities of the platform (Cottrell and Koput, 1998) . Second, they increase the value of a platform to potential adopters by allowing them to exploit its features more fully (McIntyre and Subramaniam 2009 ). The translation add-on of Mozilla Firefox, for example, enhances users' ability to surf the web via access to more information in foreign languages. Third, add-ons increase the confidence among potential adopters that a platform will not disappear in the short term (Adner and Kapoor, 2010) . Thus, we conclude:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): As the number of the OSS complements increases, the potential size of the OSS platform community also increases.
Release Strategy
OSS developers issue more frequent software releases than developers of proprietary software (Bonaccorsi and Rossi 2003, Feller and Fitzgerald) . A faster release frequency may attract more community contributions (e.g., bug fixes), which then help to improve software quality. A faster release would also reward contributors if it shortens the time it takes to accept their product suggestions (Raymond 1999) . Lastly, a quick lease can signal the energy and momentum of an OSS project, and this often give users more confidence to adopt new software.
Thus, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 4 (H4): As an OSS platform or its developers release new versions, adoptions of the OSS complements increase.
Effects of End-User's Generated Contents
As mentioned earlier, OSS end-users generate online word of mouth (WOM), and observational learning signals. Online WOM may include 1) the valence and variance of product ratings; and 2) observational learning the number of daily users of the add-on. These two signals indicate the direct network effects of the community's opinions and actions (respectively) on add-on adoption. That is, the valence gives adopters efficient access to opinions of the OSS community (Henning-Thurau and Gwinner 2004); so more positive valences should spur adoption (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006) . Conversely, the variance of the ratings reflects the community's valuation uncertainty (Sun 2012) . Nevertheless, although a consumer may avoid adopting proprietary software with high valuation uncertainty, a risk-averse user may still decide to adopt an OSS complement because the expected benefit of free software may outweigh the expected loss of (say) a malicious Trojan (Golden 2005) . Indeed, because OSS add-ons are free, a user might embrace the potential uncertainty of finding useful software, without paying for it (Martin et al 2007; Water 2012) . Furthermore, a large number of users of the complement may signal its value to potential adopters, who in turn may put different weights on online ratings and observational learning. As a result, studies tend to separate the effects of observational learning from those of online WOM; for the former induces herding behavior ; but the later signals to potential adopters the complement's the lower cognitive cost of use and user friendliness. Thus, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 5a (H5a): As the rating valence and dispersion of an OSS complement increase, the adopters of the OSS complement increase.
Hypothesis 5b (H5b): As the numbers of the daily users of an OSS complement increase, the adopters of the OSS complement increase.
MODEL DEVELOPMENT

Our main task is to quantify the factors that can influence the interdependent diffusion of
an open platform and its many add-ons. As a result, we build upon the basic Bass diffusion model, BDM (Bass 1969) , given its parsimony and the intuitive interpretations of its parameters (Hauser et al. 2006) . Specifically, we adopt the BDM to build system of differential equations, subsequently expressed in state space form. Thus, the first equation of the system models diffusion of the platform, and the others the diffusion of its add-ons. Our model has several notable features. For example, we allow diffusion to be latent, random processes; which in turn give us the flexibility to model adoption patterns beyond the ones underlying the mixed effects, or basic diffusion model (Goswami 2001) . Similarly, we link diffusion parameters to online ratings and observational learning from daily use; these variable vary across product and time;
and so in this way we account for adoption heterogeneity (Dellarocas et al. 2007 ). In addition to testing the above hypotheses, H1-H5, the model captures the role of developer incentives and license types; as well as controls for churn across add-ons. We model churn or dis-adoption because OSS complements are free but often non-unique; and consequently consumers may find them simultaneously easy to adopt and dis-adopt. Similarly, because only platform users can adopt a complement, we allow the market size of the complement to be some proportion of platform adopters, as adoption evolves over time. This proportion, our "relevance" parameter, should reflect the fact OSS complements often have narrow market appeal.
Diffusion of OSS Platform
We begin with a diffusion model for the platform that reflects the indirect externality of its complements (e.g., Gupta et al. 1999) , as well as other external forces that can influence its adoption. Formally, we let t m denote the latent cumulative number of adopters of the platform at time t, where M is the market potential; and p and q the external and internal market forces' parameters, elsewhere termed innovation and contagion, respectively. Thus the diffusion, differential equation of the platform has the form:
To model the influence of competition (H1) and governance (H2) on the platform's diffusion, we adopt the method proposed in Horskey and Simon (1983) , modeling the external force parameter as the time-varying function: In addition, we quantify indirect externality (H3) by allowing the market potential of the platform to vary with the number of complements that OSS community creates on the platform (Gupta et al. 1999; Stremersch et al. 2007 ). In other words, new complements may attract new platform adopters by (for example) uncovering regions of unmet consumer needs. Formally, we let the platforms' market size evolves with following process:
3)
where then denotes the unexplained market potential; the accumulative number of addons up to time t; and a parameter to be estimated. Thus, our platform model (equation 1) explicitly captures forces consistent with indirect network externality (equation 3), and those with direct network externality, as implied by the adoption ratio, t t M qm / (Bass 1969) .
Diffusion of OSS Complements
Given the platform specification, we now describe the interrelated diffusion of its complements, again using the BDM framework. The novelty here is that we endogenize the market potential of the complements and control for their dis-adoption. Formally, we let jt n denote the latent cumulative number of adopters of the OSS complement j at time t; then diffusion of each complement becomes:
where t m represents the latent cumulative number of platform adopters at time t; jt p and jt q the external and internal diffusion parameters;
the dis-adoption rate. That is, we use the method outlined in Libai et al.
(2009) to model churn, assuming that the fraction that dis-adopts, j  does not spread word of mouth for the software. We think dis-adoption is a relevant feature here, given the low-costs and often non-uniqueness of OSS complements, and their analogy to services, which users can and often choose to dis-adopt (Keck 2015). Also, because many OSS complements cannot be used without adopting an OSS platform (e.g., Firefox add-ons) and add-ons tend to be narrowly defined, we restrict the relevance parameter, j
To study the effects of a quick release strategy on OSS (H4) 6) where  is the last version release time, and the decay factor. We set  to 0.89 the estimated decay factor of a discrete time analog model of Nerlove and Arrow (1962) . We follow the same procedure to create jt PV . Later we consider the potential endogeneity of these variables, and robustness of the smoothing procedure used to create them (See Web Appendix A).
Next we investigate the role of quality signals (H5) generated from the user community by modeling the imitation (WOM) factor as the function: Finally, to explain heterogeneity in the parameters of our joint diffusion model, we use a vector of license and potential business model information of each OSS complement. This vector includes a dummy variable for whether the add-on has the options of "ask for money contribution" or "meet the developer", and whether its license is one of the following types: "Fully Free", "Restricted", or "Mozilla". Formally, we define the vector of parameters as Second, the market potential of the complement is proportional to the number of platform adopters; third, it allows for complement dis-adoption, a likely scenario for OSS complements; fourth, it captures the indirect network effect through online WOM and user activity; and finally, it allows time varying parameters in the bass model, which then makes it simple to test features of open source innovation.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
So far we have presented a theoretical model of diffusion. To address our substantive questions (H1-H5), we will have to recast the model to an empirical form, address identification concerns, and present an estimation procedure to recover model parameters. First, however, let us consider the data available to help identify these parameters.
Data Description
Our main data is an unbalanced panel of daily downloads of 52 Firefox Add-ons --freesoftware that extends the Mozilla browser to include features such as games and entertainment, privacy and security, language support, and web development tools. Tables 1-2 define --Insert Tables 1-2 here ---Insert Tables 3-6 here --We also obtained data on add-on/platform releases, developer reward incentives, add-on license types, and OSS governance. We smoothed the OSS new release variables using the procedure outlined earlier. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the smoothed new release measures for a sample of four add-ons. For incentives measures, we extracted data from the main page of each add-on that indicates whether its developer preferred to solicit money from or to meet endusers. In addition, Mozilla Firefox uses various licenses to protect the intellectual property of their developers (See Tables 2 and 3) ; thus we extracted licenses data for each add-on. Finally, to publish on the Mozilla Platform's website an add-on should pass the filter of the Add-on Mozilla Organization review (AMO) committee, a self-organized team of the experienced add-on developers who review add-ons or new releases submitted by fellow developers. We mined the monthly performance data (from Mozilla's website) of this review committee.
--Insert Figure 3 here --There are 19,211 online ratings in our sample (of 52 add-ons) in the period of the study.
We used historical ratings data to build rating valences and rating variances, using the same process Mozilla Firefox uses to generate them for its OSS community. Observation learning comes from the visible, daily users of the add-on; on average 0.9M OSS community members use add-ons, with a variance of 2M. Lastly, we transformed several variables to avoid multicollinearity and thus improve our computations. That is, we rescaled and demeaned: AMO review committee's performance; the daily usage of the Chrome and the IE; rescaled the daily use of the Firefox and the cumulative daily downloads of the Firefox Add-ons; and demeaned product ratings mean and variance; observational learning from daily users(after same scaling); and the smoothed new releases' data.
Empirical Model
Admittedly, the diffusion processes and the data described earlier could be prone to process and measurement errors, in other words, a form of unobserved temporal heterogeneity.
Thus first we assume the platform and complement diffusions to be latent, random processes; and consequently augment the differential equations 1-4, for t m and jt n with additive random, normal errors; that is, equations 1-4 now become differential equations for the means of the platform and complement diffusion processes. As mentioned earlier, treating the diffusion processes (and its parameters) as random, give us the flexibility to model other growth patterns beyond the standard s-shaped pattern (Karmeshu and Goswami 2001) . We should also discretize these differential equations to obtain a model in state-space form (equations 11 and 10). This discrete form has several immediate advantages: it obviates the need to solve a large, intractable system of non-linear of differential equations (1 platform + 52 add-ons); and so is convenient for handling multivariate data (i.e., many complements) and the nonlinear dynamics embedded in the diffusion process (see, for example, Durbin and Koopman 2001, pp. 51-53 , where 
Identification and Endogeneity
Before reviewing the estimation method we need to address potential endogeneity and identification concerns. For example, AMO performances and OSS release frequency are two potential sources of endogeneity. The release frequency may correlate with OSS adoption costs because adoption costs, which we do not observe, can spur OSS diffusion. Similarly, AMO performance can be higher due to higher levels of developer and end-user participation; and community participation could influence OSS project success (Grewal et al. 2006; Lerner et al. 2006 ). Thus, we test for endogeneity, employing a latent instrumental variable (LIV) approach (e.g., Naik and Tsai 2000; Rutz et. al 2010) , but found no evidence of such in our sample to bias estimates of these two variables (See Web Appendix A).
Also our long time series and the variations across Firefox's add-ons allow us to identify the diffusion parameters. Moreover, our daily data should mitigate potential interval bias attributed to discrete-time bass diffusion models (Xie et al. 1997) ; for Putsis and Srinivasan (1999) report less severe interval bias when studies use monthly rather than the annual data.
Lastly, the MCMC estimation employed, not only eases dealing with unbalanced nature of our data, but also allows us to characterize the inherent uncertainty in the diffusion parameters (Lenk and Rao1990; and Putsis and Srinivasan 1999). while the UKF instead approximates the posteriors of the state variables by sets of sample points (Ristic et al. 2004 ). Thus, for highly nonlinear Gaussian systems the UKF produces typically better results, but our diffusion model is quadratic and so we adopt the EKF-MCMC, our
Markov Chain Monte-Carlo approach to the EKF, which subsequently performs well. Also, in our application the EKF is more computationally efficient given the sizeable dimension of our state space (52 add-ons) and the maximum length our time-series (T=1686).
Extended Kalman Filtering and MCMC (EKF-MCMC) Algorithm
Our estimation task then is to recover the following components for the platform and Tables 7-11 and figures 4-6 summarize the main findings of our study, which includes the evaluations of a) hypotheses H1-H5; and b) the robustness and fit of the proposed model.
ESTIMATION RESULTS
First, table 7 compares the performance of our proposed model against those of nine alternatives in terms deviance information criteria (DIC). Notably, the proposed model outperforms all alternatives in terms of DIC, a suitable criterion for hierarchical model selection (Spiegelhalter et al. 2002) . Similarly, Figures 4 and 5 reports the 1-step-ahead forecast the Firefox platform and four of its complements; all track the data with some precision as shown in the mean absolute deviation (MAD) and mean squared error (MSE) scores in Table 8 . Thus these fit and forecast measures point to the ability of our proposed model to capture the underlying diffusion process. find the effect of the AMO review process to be positive and significant (H2), which again suggest the importance of the OSS community, and its self-governance to platform success. We will return to this issue later. Finally, the effect of the cumulative number of add-ons on the marketing potential of the Mozilla platform  is positive and significant (H3); this suggests one mechanism for the effect of indirect network externality on an OSS platform, and underscores the importance of add-ons to platform diffusion. This finding is even more interesting because the direct network effect parameter 0 q is insignificant, which implies that the appeal of Firefox has more to do with the availability of it complements. positive effect of dispersion on the performances of movie and beer brands, which suggests that consumer behaviors in these two categories may share some similarity with those in a OSS community. Nevertheless, the founding advocate of free software, Richard Stallman once said in reference to OSS: "This is a matter of freedom, not price, so think of "free speech," not "free beer." 3 We thus surmise that our finding of a positive impact of variance on OSS diffusion maybe be attributed more to the joy of experiencing freedom, and less to the joy of surprise.
Finally, Table 10 reports small, positive estimates of churn j  and the relevance j  parameter.
The histogram in figure 6 shows a left skewed distribution for the relevance parameters, which suggests that in an OSS context an innovation does not have to be highly relevant to obtain large numbers of potential adopters; so the OSS ecosystem allows people with heterogeneous preferences to co-exist. We find also that the daily churn of the OSS complements are on average 1.74%, which is closer to monthly estimates for online brokerage, books, and satellite radio in Libai et al. 2009 than to the yearly estimates for cellular phones.
Lastly, would freely contribute them to the platform without the need to protect their intellectual property, and so here licenses restrictiveness becomes less relevant. For these reasons, we are not entirely surprised by these findings.
AMO EDITORIAL EFFORT REALLOCATION
We have seen that OSS governance, the AMO editor contributions, can improve platform success (H2). As a result, though Mozilla may not have direct control of the third-party AMO;
Mozilla could be tempted to use soft power to organize events 4 or hire temporary staff to influence the pace of the editorial process, to the satisfaction of the add-on developer community. We consider the result of one such scenario. That is, we consider whether Mozilla could have allocated the editorial effort differently to increase platform diffusion; and then compare the features of the actual AMO effort to one that Mozilla would have implemented. For this scenario, we assume the AMO's total effort is fixed, and that Mozilla internalizes the editorial process in order to maximize the diffusion of Firefox. Our model task then is to recover a best editorial committee effort over 1,424 days of the study.
For this purpose we solve a large scale non-linear problem to find the optimal daily editorial effort of AMO editors. The problem can be conceived as finding a sequence of the proposed contributions Y  Now because finding the optimal solution requires exponential time order processing, we use the genetic algorithm (GA) available in MATLAB. Recall, the GA starts with a random candidate population; and through the processes of selection, cross over and mutation, it produces better off-springs (schedules) in subsequent generations and converges on a set that is most likely to contain the optimal schedule. Table 12 
CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS
We study the interdependent diffusion of an open source software (OSS) platform and its software complements, new product diffusion in the absence of typical marketing incentives.
Here an OSS platform is a type of distributed innovation in which an owner invites third-party collaborators to create add-ons/plug-ins that extend the features of the platform. Our goal was to quantify the effects of i) platform competition; ii) add-on reviews or OSS governance; iii) network externality of complements; iv) frequent software releases; and v) online word of mouth and observational learning signals, all on OSS diffusion.
To measure these effects we extend the Bass model (BDM) to allow for parameter dynamics, heterogeneity (e.g., p, q), endogeneity (e.g., market potential, M). We apply the extended model to a canonical example, the diffusion of the Mozilla Firefox browser and 52 of its add-ons. We re-cast the resulting 53 differential equations into non-linear, discrete-time, statespace forms; and then estimate this interdependent system using an MCMC approach to the Extended Kalman Filter (EKF), a Sequential Monte Carlo method that works with normal-linear approximations. Our EKF-MCMC algorithm is preferred here to other Gaussian filters such as the Unscented Kalman Filter (UKF) and the Augmented Kalman Filter with continuous state space and discrete observations (AKF-CD) given the low order of our non-linearity but high dimensions of our state-space; the lengths of our sample (T=1686 days) and the importance of heterogeneity. Moreover our daily data mitigates potential interval bias attributed to discretetime bass diffusion models.
We obtained several interesting results. First, results show the indirect network effects (of add-ons) on the platform to be positive and significant; but the direct network effects to be insignificant. Thus, OSS platforms should also encourage content creation (i.e., add-ons) rather than focus exclusively on generating platform awareness. Results also show that the add-on (editorial) review process can help spur platform diffusion. As a result, a platform could be tempted to internalize the editorial review process or use more soft power to influence it. In fact, our simulation showed that Mozilla could probably increase its diffusion by reducing the fluctuations of and speeding-up the AMO's response to nominations from its developers.
Similarly, ratings valence and variance, and observational learning all had positive effects on add-on diffusion. Platforms owner should therefore make these quality signals readily transparent because they help effect the match between the two sides of the platform, developers and end-users.
Finally, some of our findings point to the delicate balance OSS platforms must maintain between i) the ideals of democratic participation (e.g., accepting add-ons without screening for market needs) (poetry); and ii) the practical task of creating competitive software (pragmatism).
For example, we find that OSS platforms compete rather than complement each other and so OSS platforms may need to consider marketing strategies to differentiate their products; ideas that traditionally motivate proprietary software teams; but could alienate OSS developers.
Moreover, our findings of the positive influences of the "release early and release often" concept of Raymond (1999) gives the OSS platforms a tool to increase societal welfare by providing more innovations faster, but also to compete with open or even proprietary systems. Yet we find that OSS license types and commercial incentives for developers had no effect on platforms performance; this means OSS platform could be more democratic (than proprietary) to allow individuals with broad types of incentives to participate in OSS innovation, given that they comply with OSS rules.
Nevertheless, our work has several limitations that potentially could be addressed with the benefit of additional data. First, with individual level data on the activities of OSS members, we could better explain the macro level findings above. In this case our macro-level diffusion models would have to emerge from individual behaviors of and interactions among OSS adopters. Still, we would need to invent a fruitful way to incorporate micro level data into our mixed influence, aggregate diffusion models. Moreover, for an accurate forecast of the platform and complement adoption, the models would require data on all potential adopters. Second, our study lacks information on the software code or bug feedbacks from the AMO editors to the developers; having that data may give us some knowledge on the quality or effectiveness of the OSS developer community. It would also have been useful to model the diffusion of both OSS and proprietary platforms; so we could contrast the differences in factors that drive their diffusions. Finally, even though our results are consistent with predictions, we obtained our results for an open browser platform (Firefox); and so it would be useful to extend our analysis to other forms of OSS platforms (e.g., OS). The observed cumulative of number of users who downloaded an add-on in a given day. Mozilla Firefox daily Users ( pt y )
The daily number of users of Mozilla Firefox's platform. We recovered this information by multiplying the daily Mozilla Firefox market share by the monthly number of internet hosts. Total number of add-ons created per day( t A )
The cumulative number of add-ons created by the community of developers from the inception of our data. Google Chrome daily Users (
The daily number of users of Chrome. We recovered this information by multiplying daily Google Chrome's market share by the monthly total number of internet hosts. We use this variable to explain the external diffusion market force. Microsoft Internet Explorer (IE) daily Users (
The daily number of users of Internet Explorer. We recovered this information by multiplying daily Microsoft Internet Explorer's market share by monthly total number of internet hosts. We use this variable to explain the external diffusion market forces. New Version of add-on( jt AV )
An indicator variable that shows a new version is issued. We smooth it based on demand and release trend curve presented by Wiggins et al. (2009) 5 and based on consumer procrastination theory with a 0.8 factor that is the decay parameter of our estimated Nerlov and Arrow model. After nomination, the add-on status page will indicate the status of "In Sandbox: Public Nomination". This means the add-on is in the nomination review queue 6 , the size of which we capture in this variable. Total number of monthly AMO
In order for an add-on version to become public and readily
Editor's contribution(
available to all, it needs to be submitted to a review committee (AMO). This process is called nomination 7 . AMO engages in four types of activities:
8 full review nominations, full review updates, preliminary reviews, and response to info request.
9
Mozilla Firefox forum calls the sum of the number of responses of AMO to these incidences or nominations, total editor contributions, which we capture in this variable. The discrete number of stars that show rate of the product out of 5. We recovered this information from the historical data of rating, the same way Mozilla Firefox generates it. Rating Variance (
The variance of distribution of product ratings. We recovered this from the historical data on distribution of product ratings. We use the same approach (E1) to test for the endogeneity of the smoothed new release variables for Mozilla platform and its complements. Table 1B presents the confidence intervals of these error correlations and variance-covariance matrix elements. Similarly, the correlation and the off diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix suggest that there is no significant endogeneity.
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